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THE CONCEPT OF "SMART DEFENSE" 
IN THE CONTEXT 
OF AN EFFICIENT DEFENSE PLANNING
The international security environment is currently undergoing a series of 
fundamental changes becoming increasingly complex. Consequently, international 
actors need to ﬁ  nd innovative ways to manage security and defense. The global 
ﬁ  nancial and economic crisis has had a strong impact on military budgets, making 
it necessary for states and regional and international organizations concerned 
with such issues to streamline their defense planning and the more so because, 
in addition to the  already consecrated risks and security threats, there are also 
new challenges. The concepts of “pooling and sharing” and “smart defense” have 
become, in this context, increasingly popular generating new initiatives in defense 
planning. However, despite some successes in this regard and their presentation as 
ideal solutions for managing defense in the current context, these concepts involve 
a number of difﬁ  culties to overcome that sometimes may translate into strategic 
political military and even economic disadvantages.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The international security environment is currently subject to a series of 
fundamental changes altering the way the defense and security problem is 
addressed. The most signiﬁ  cant one occurs in the polarity of the international 
system that switches from a unipolar conﬁ   guration to a multipolar one, that is from the existence of several countries comparable in terms of the 
power resources they hold and that are centered around a single power center 
with signiﬁ  cantly more capabilities than other actors [1] to the existence of 
multiple power centers in the international arena with comparable resources. 
To be more speciﬁ  c, this change refers to the decrease of the U.S.A. inﬂ  uence 
and power and the emergence of new power centers usually known by the 
acronym of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South America), to which 
we might also add Turkey. Another signiﬁ  cant change is the emergence of a 
new area characterized by a high conﬂ  ict potential and located in southern and 
south-eastern Mediterranean which was the result of the popular uprisings 
that took place in early 2011 in North Africa and the Middle East, categorized 
by Western researchers as a “democratic wave in the Arab world”[2]. 
However, the international security environment is still under the inﬂ  uence 
of what are now viewed as classic risks and threats - international terrorism, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, inter-ethnic conﬂ  icts,  and 
organized crime. 
All of the above occur simultaneously with another phenomenon of 
utmost importance and inﬂ  uence for nowadays world, namely the economic 
and ﬁ  nancial crisis that has triggered not only economic, but also political 
and social effects. Moreover, the undeniable link between the economic 
dimension of any international actor’s security and other dimensions makes 
the military area no exception from the consequences of the aforementioned 
crisis. Therefore, like any other industry, the military, whether represented 
by national armed forces or by the ones of international organizations need 
ﬁ  nancial support in order to exist and function.
Thus, the need to act and react in an international security environment 
is increasingly complicated and more variable given the fewer resources. 
Regarding the Euro-Atlantic area, the decision of the U.S.A. to emphasize the 
need to rebalance defense spending among NATO members given its previous 
contribution of about 75% to NATO total budget, the security and defense 
ﬁ  nancial dimension has acquired new features. In addition, after 2008, the 
economic and ﬁ  nancial crisis [3] has driven European states to decrease their 
contribution to the budget of the alliance. That resulted in NATO’s efforts to 
ﬁ  nd new solutions to maintain the Alliance’s ability to fulﬁ  ll its missions in 
accordance with the Washington Treaty and the Strategic Concept. In parallel, 
the EU took a similar approach. 
Consequently, the two organizations started implementing a new concept 
in defense planning, known as “pooling and sharing” at EU level and “smart 
defense” at NATO level. Regardless of its name, the latter is actually a method 
of buying and using expensive military equipment in a joint manner. Basically, 
the concept describes various forms of defense cooperation, involving the 
merger of ﬁ  nancial resources to purchase expensive military equipment and 
its use in common.2. THE EUROPEAN UNION
&
THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY
The concepts of “pooling and sharing”/“smart defense” which imply, on 
the one hand, the development or acquisition of military equipment in the 
Union that could not be achieved by states on an individual base and, on the 
other hand, their shared use emerged at EU level and not at NATO, as one 
would have expected. The idea of purchasing and sharing expensive military 
equipment is inherent to the principles included in the founding documents 
of the European Defence Agency (EDA). Thus, both in the Common Council 
Decision 2004/551/CFSP on the establishment of the European Defence 
Agency (2004) [4], and in the Council Decision 2011/411/PESC deﬁ  ning the 
status and operational rules of the European Defence Agency and repealing 
Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP (2011) [5], the tasks and responsibilities include 
promoting harmonization of operational needs and adoption of effective, 
compatible procurement, in particular by: 
a) promoting and coordinating harmonization of military requirements;
b) promoting cost-effective and efﬁ  cient procurement by identifying and 
disseminating best practices;
c) providing appraisals on ﬁ  nancial priorities for capabilities development 
and acquisition (Article 5, 3 (b).
Basically, the EDA has emerged since the beginning of the EU as 
a specialized body whose main task was to coordinate and encourage 
cooperation between member states in matters related to the acquisition and 
development of military equipment. As part of the EDA, member states may 
initiate programs to develop capabilities, with EDA providing expertise, 
legal and administrative assistance to support their initiatives. Within this 
context, it is worth reminding the EU’s approach to the security and defense 
dimension over time marked by the reluctance of its member states to invest 
and support this dimension. However, the latter was much better developed 
and, especially, ﬁ  nanced by the U.S.A. as part of its NATO membership.
Therefore, when the military budgets of the member states began to decline, 
the idea long developed by the EU has acquired the name of “pooling and 
sharing”, it was publicized and accepted as a solution for continuing efforts 
to ensure security in the global ﬁ  nancial and economic crisis. Afterwards, it 
was adopted, developed and implemented by NATO. Moreover, the fact that 
“pooling and sharing” is a concept of European origin is conﬁ  rmed by the 
considerable number of predisposing factors and experiences of this kind 
in the EU, allowing a group of countries to achieve a high degree of integration, 
assuming that the others would catch up as their necessary capabilities 
develop [6].The increasing interest in implementing the concept of “pooling and 
sharing”, which proved an efﬁ  cient way to strengthen the European military 
power in a period of austerity, is the result of economic factors. The Ghent 
initiative played an important role in the development of this concept. The 
latter  consisted in the effort of the 27 EU Member States’ defense ministers 
to ﬁ  nd solutions to strengthen European military capabilities in the context 
of budget cuts and rising cost investments in the military. The stated goal of 
the initiative was to “preserve and increase national operational capabilities 
- resulting in improved effects, sustainability, interoperability and cost-
effectiveness” [7]. For this, areas of cooperation were identiﬁ  ed in order 
to ensure a more efﬁ  cient expenditure of existing resources across Europe 
and to maintain a range of military capabilities aimed at achieving national 
political ambitions and the EU’s ability to act credibly in crisis situations. 
Subsequently, each member state had to make an inventory of its national 
military capabilities. The lists of stocks were then centralized by the EU bodies 
in a document illustrating the state of affairs in this ﬁ  eld in Europe, followed 
by capability plans and by the identiﬁ  cation of possible areas of cooperation. 
Afterwards, the member states had to identify the actions that could be taken 
at national level and the partners for cooperation. The role of EDA is to work 
together with other EU bodies as facilitators in the process of cooperation. 
Given the adaptation of this approach to the characteristics of the international 
context (the implications of the economic and ﬁ  nancial crisis, in particular), 
the presentation of feasible solutions and the focus on ﬁ  nding solutions have 
led to an increasing acknowledgement  of the “pooling and sharing” concept. 
Basically, once the inventories of existing military capabilities is over, every 
member state needs to avoid investments in those capabilities that already 
exist in other member states and instead focus on those capabilities that are 
necessary in order to achieve national strategic objectives and maintain the 
EU as a relevant security actor. Therefore, the “pooling and sharing” initiative 
actually resides in the avoidance of capabilities duplication, both at EU and 
NATO-EU level. Compared to similar cooperative efforts undertaken within 
the EU over time and strictly limited to cooperation on speciﬁ  c projects, the 
aforementioned initiative takes a strategic, comprehensive outlook on all 
existing capabilities within the EU member states, the way they can be used 
in a joint manner, as well as on the gaps in the security and defense areas 
identiﬁ  ed in the treaties signed by member states and yet difﬁ  cult to bridge 
despite the commitments made. Thus, within the Ghent initiative, we have 
identiﬁ  ed the following areas where multilateral cooperation could bring 
added value to the Common Security and Defence Policy [8]:
Harmonization of the military requirements •  . This needs to occur at the 
level of the objectives related to the capabilities issue that were established 
at national and EU level.Research and Development.  •  It is  an area considered essential for 
improving existing capabilities and for developing new ones.
Procurement •  . Aggregating national requirements savings can be made 
to the economy of mass production. In order to achieve cost efﬁ  ciency, 
the harmonization of military requirements and contract awards based on 
competition are important prerequisites. When the document known as 
the Ghent initiative was issued, the EU had already issued two directives, 
thus creating the legal framework for meeting the above conditions. 
One of the Directives was aimed at simplifying the terms and conditions 
for defense-related products’ transfers within the community [9] and 
hence, at harmonizing the European weapons market and reducing the 
administrative procedures that hinder the movement of military equipment 
between EU member states. The other one regulated the coordination of 
procedures for the award of certain work contracts, supply of goods and 
provision of services by contracting authorities or entities in the ﬁ  elds of 
defense and security [10].
Training and exercises •   play an important role in the context of European 
forces tendency to decrease in number. Therefore, applying the “pooling 
and sharing” concept to the facilities available for training could not only 
contribute to lower costs, but also to increased interoperability.
Command structures and procedures •  .
Cost management.  •  Providing expensive goods (e.g. strategic 
recognition, etc.) is a priority in the efforts to increase cooperation.
Consequently, initiatives such as Helicopter Training Program, Maritime 
Surveillance Network, European Satellite Communications Procurement 
Cell, campaign  hospitals, air refueling, Future Military Satellite 
Communications, Reconnaissance - Surveillance - Intelligence, Pilots’ 
Training, European Centre for Transportation, Smart Ammunition, 
Logistics and Naval Training were under discussion [11].
All of the above considered, the idea of     “pooling and sharing” involves 
cooperative and harmonization efforts in the security and defense industry ﬁ  eld. 
It is, in fact, an economical solution to manage the impact of the economic and 
ﬁ  nancial crisis on military budgets. Although not necessarily a new concept, 
its scale and importance nowadays are new. Also, the fact that “pooling and 
sharing” is an economical solution for managing current challenges and that 
the idea itself is not fundamentally new can be found in the emphasis placed 
on research and development the in 2020 Strategy where smart (i.e. “smart 
growth”) was deﬁ  ned as “developing an economy based on knowledge and 
innovation”[12]. Research and development can boost resource efﬁ  ciency 
and create new jobs. Basically, research and development are key factors 
in economic growth and their inclusion in initiatives to streamline defense 
spending becomes natural. By including R&D in its areas of concern, the “pooling and sharing” initiative is in line with the efforts to manage the effects 
of the ﬁ  nancial economic crisis in all areas, the defense sector being one of them. 
Furthermore, from this perspective, “pooling and sharing” can be an effective 
initiative because EDA has included research and development capabilities 
in its activities since the signing of its founding act [13]. Moreover, the 
initiatives established under Strategy 2020 - Innovation Union – have created 
an environment for developing and promoting new ideas. Moreover, the EU 
Council meeting of 22-23 March 2012 stressed the importance of creating 
synergies between the policies of EDA and of the European Commission, 
particularly in the ﬁ  eld of investments in Research and Technology. This is 
believed to be a solution to strengthening the Defence Technological Industrial 
Base in Europe [14]. The €15.8 billion program in research technologies, as 
well as the research programs in marine systems and unmanned aerial systems 
started by 12 EU Member States together is proof of the opportunities created 
by all of the above. In other words, the EU has created a very favorable 
framework that allows the development of research and development in all 
areas, the “pooling and sharing” concept deﬁ  ning the military applicability 
of a European general economic development. In fact, the declaration of the 
EU Commissioner responsible for research, innovation and science on the 
importance of research and innovation is signiﬁ  cant in this respect: “Europe 
is facing a debt crisis and the greatest economic challenges for decades. The 
Member States take measures to cut budget, but we must ensure that these 
measures do not cut even the driving force of economic recovery: research and 
innovation. Investing in research and innovation now is the recipe for ensuring 
jobs and growth in the future.”[15]. This statement highlights both the impact 
of the international economic context and the need to identify a new approach.
Also, another relevant aspect is the likeness between the permanent 
cooperation prerequisite and the “pooling and sharing” initiative. The 
existence of a provision mentioning this form of cooperation in the Lisbon 
Treaty is undoubtedly an advantage for strengthening and increasing the 
cooperation in the security and defense related industry. Nonetheless, this 
requires identifying and undertaking small projects, small initiatives on 
speciﬁ  c issues by certain members in a cooperative manner, while the other 
states are to join them when they have the will and power to do so. 
“Pooling and sharing” is, from the outset, a European-wide concept and 
implies that all member states are involved and all have certain advantages 
in terms of cost efﬁ  ciency and equipment necessary to achieve national 
interests and fulﬁ  ll their responsibilities in the EU. Moreover, “pooling and 
sharing” involves extensive European synergies in the security and defense 
industry. However, it is necessary to remove all potential obstacles to the 
implementation of this concept, obstacles that can be found in the very 
way in which security and defense work at EU level [16]. Therefore, the implementation of this concept may be confronted not only with distinct 
visions and priorities, but also with the reluctance of national authorities to 
be part of such an effort. For example, at the end of 2010, three EU member 
states - France, Germany and Poland - launched an initiative aimed at the 
creation of a military operational headquarters in Brussels, a proposal opposed 
by the United Kingdom on reasons of task overlapping, duplication with NATO. 
On the other hand, we must not minimize the impact of the current economic 
climate on the perception and endeavors to tackle security and defense. In 
this respect, a viable and proﬁ  table solution would ultimately allow member 
states to maintain or improve their ability to guarantee the security of their 
citizens and to meet commitments at regional and international levels.
3. NATO AND “SMART DEFENSE”
“Smart Defense” is equivalent to the “pooling and sharing” concept 
implemented at EU level. “Smart defense” was adopted in the context of a 
major imbalance in the contributions made to the NATO budget, an imbalance 
considerably enhanced by the effects of the economic and ﬁ  nancial crisis. 
The decline of the U.S.A. power, the main contributor to the NATO budget, 
alongside with the change in its strategic priorities concerning the Asia-Paciﬁ  c 
region [17] also had an impact on NATO’s organization and functioning. The 
recently launched concept of “smart defense” is part of the transformations 
undergone by the Alliance under the impact of major international events. 
According to NATO’s ofﬁ   cial website, the concept was adopted by the 
Alliance in the context of a crisis and of the need to “rebalance” the uneven 
efforts taken by the U.S.A. and European countries with their defense 
spending so that, in the end, the defense “burden” is fairly shared. In general, 
it is aimed at covering those defense capabilities involving considerable 
expenses, namely anti-ballistic protection, surveillance and reconnaissance, 
intelligence, maintenance and training, education and employment training, 
effective engagement and force protection. Basically, “smart defense” is 
a solution to maintain NATO’s ability to fulﬁ  ll its missions in accordance 
with the Washington Treaty and the Strategic Concept. Thus, the Alliance 
maintains its ability to respond to the increasing complexity of the international 
security environment characterized by the presence of the same security risks 
and threats that have to be countered with declining military budgets.  As 
previously mentioned, the U.S.A. is an exception to this situation. 
The implementation of the Alliance Concept involves developing those 
capabilities NATO mostly needs within the current international context. The 
Alliance operates similarly to the EU’s EDA that acts as a facilitator and interim 
framework in which its members can decide what can get together, at lower 
costs, more efﬁ  ciently and with fewer risks. In the case of NATO, the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) plays the coordination role. Another important 
structure in implementing the concept of “smart defense” is the Conference of 
National Armaments Directors, the main NATO committee responsible for 
promoting cooperation in supplying weapons and capabilities to improve the 
effectiveness of NATO forces. Moreover, on July 6, 2012, an agency similar 
to EDA - NATO Procurement Organization (NPO) was created within NATO 
[18] in order to provide a framework which would integrate the multinational 
procurement programs. At the moment, NPO is still being organized in terms 
of the structure and processes that will underpin its operation. Also, the ofﬁ  cial 
NATO website states that NPO will build on the experience of the existing 
multinational procurement agencies [19] that will continue to operate as such 
until NPO is operational or until the member who is involved in the NPO will 
decide the integration. However, the existence of specialized multinational 
procurement agencies clearly reveals that the idea of     “smart defense” is not a new 
one. However, the concept acquires a new scope and new meanings in the global 
ﬁ  nancial and economic crisis.  In addition, as with EDA, the implementation 
of “smart defense” requires certain necessary steps. The ﬁ  rst is to prioritize 
the necessary national capabilities in accordance with Alliance’s requests so 
that the main objectives identiﬁ  ed in the defense planning coincide with those 
deﬁ  ned by NATO. The second step is specialization, namely the need for states 
to cut out from their budgets the expenditures with those capabilities allotted to 
other NATO member states and to which, in accordance with the principles of 
“smart defense”, they should also have access. Specialization involves saving 
some resources and investing them in others that are insufﬁ  ciently developed or 
inexistent across the Alliance. The third step is cooperation, a core dimension 
emerging from the idea that states can, together, have access to capabilities that 
would not be otherwise available.
The initiatives developed under the concept of “smart defense” at NATO 
level focused on extremely costly capabilities. Out of these, the following can 
be mentioned:
The •   land, sea and air surveillance systems play a particularly important 
role in the protection of NATO forces in theaters. The equipment needed 
for the NATO Air-Ground Surveillance (AGS) system have already been 
purchased through a multinational agreement among Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Norway, Romania, Slovakia and the U.S.A.
The  •  airborne warning and control system (AWACS).
The f •  ight against improvised explosive devices (IED) is another key point 
in the protection of NATO forces in theaters of operations, given that over 
half of those wounded in battleﬁ  eld were injured by such devices. In this 
respect, in November 2011, thirteen countries decided to jointly acquire 
control technologies for IED. The •   missile shield could be considered another example of the “smart 
defense” implementation. Its construction was initiated by the U.S.A., 
Turkey, Spain, Poland and Romania agreed to host its elements on its 
own territory. To thi purpose, the Netherlands announced plans to equip 
four vessels with radar and Germany ponders over offering its Patriot 
systems.
Cyber attacks •    defense is another area where “smart defense” is 
implemented through projects involving innovative technologies and 
operational support.
Command and Control systems,  •  etc.
In the same vein, Norway launched an initiative concerning integrity 
development. The latter is based on the assumption that, in order to implement 
“smart defense” (i.e. defense intelligence), intelligent institutions are required. 
The project aims at promoting best practices and developing practical tools 
to reduce the risk of corruption and it is viewed as an appropriate support for 
Afghanistan and the countries in South Eastern Europe [20].
Unlike the EU, NATO’s approach to “smart defense” places less emphasis 
on research and development. The explanation for this may be found in the 
distinct nature of the two organizations. The EU was primarily formed, 
deﬁ  ned and developed as a regional economic organization with an integrative 
purpose. Therefore, given the implications generated by the integration of 
different security dimensions (i.e. economic, social, political and military, 
the impact of the global ﬁ  nancial and economic crisis is greater. As a result, 
research and development represent one of the main EU levers for identifying 
comprehensive sustainable solutions to manage the effects of the crisis in 
as many areas as possible. NATO, on the other hand, is fundamentally a 
political-military alliance with responsibilities mainly related to security and 
defense. Therefore, the efforts were directed towards the identiﬁ  cation and 
development of solutions for purchasing the military equipment necessary for 
the Alliance to fulﬁ  ll its already assumed commitments. 
Research is, indeed, part of any initiative since any development (e.g. 
military equipment, armaments, command and control systems, defense 
systems, etc.) is based on it. However, in our opinion, it plays a lesser role 
in deﬁ  ning the concept of “smart defense”. For NATO, “smart defense” is 
equivalent “to spending money on defense in a smarter way” [21]. Moreover, 
in terms of research and development within NATO, the involvement of the 
Alliance in many operations involving considerable expenditures resulted 
in limited funds for research and development and procurement of new 
equipment [22]. Another likely cause for the diminished role of research and 
development in the context of “smart defense” may be the need on behalf 
of European countries to invest more in this ﬁ  eld. In this respect, it is worth reminding that, according to ofﬁ  cial documents [23], the U.S.A. invests 
seven times more than the EU in research and technology. As a result, a more 
substantial investment on behalf of the EU in this area would create new 
opportunities for the transatlantic cooperation and, hence, mutual beneﬁ  ts. 
The low level of investment in research and development at European level 
can become vulnerability and, consequently, efforts must be made towards 
addressing this issue. However, similarly to the EU that has to face certain 
obstacles to the implementation of the concept of “pooling and sharing”, 
NATO also faces its own challenges in this respect. “Smart defense” gained 
popularity and momentum during the economic and ﬁ  nancial crisis, but its 
implementation requires efforts to overcome difﬁ  culties, mostly political, 
since the member states must rely to a greater extent on each other in terms of 
jointly using capabilities in order to meet their commitments in the security 
ﬁ  eld. Besides the need to overcome the lack of trust among states, and the 
practical, procedural, institutional difﬁ  culties to implement this concept, the 
most consistent difﬁ  culty is, by far, the specialization requirement, which is 
a veritable ”Gordian knot” for the concept’s implementation [24].
As deﬁ  ned by NATO, specialization requires nations to focus solely on 
developing speciﬁ  c capabilities and abandoning the development of others, 
which are to be provided, if necessary, by other allies, under the same concept. 
It is about making efforts with permanent implications. Thus, the member 
states may be in one of the following situations: sole suppliers of certain 
equipment or completely dependent on the help of other countries. Of course, 
in this context, the security guarantee provided by Article 5 of the Washington 
Treaty must not be overlooked. 
The implications of specialization are numerous and profound.
First, specialization involves major changes within national military structures 
as a result of the states’ focus on certain military capabilities. Inherently, 
there is also the risk that states may act in accordance with the sovereignty 
principle and, as a result, show reluctance to adopt such measures. Moreover, 
the cited source identiﬁ  es six broad categories of challenges in this regard. 
The ﬁ  rst one is that specialization has an impact on the strategic ﬂ  exibility of 
each state partly because the necessary enterprise capabilities of contingency 
measures would remain uncovered, representing a vulnerability of the 
respective state actor. The second challenge refers to states’ negative political 
freedom to act or not in a given situation as it is the case. For example, a 
state along with other allies may decide to act in a particular crisis requesting 
capabilities developed by other players, or a player, who is the only holder 
of capabilities, believes that engaging in a particular crisis or conﬂ  ict is 
not consistent with its national interests. In both cases, one can speak of 
coercion: on one hand manifest in the unwillingness to act, and on the other 
hand in the decision to act. Third, establishing the criteria underlying to the composition of specialized forces is another difﬁ  culty. These forces require 
a high degree of cohesion based on the assumptions that all capabilities are 
available regardless of the nations that contribute to them and that allies tend 
to develop the necessary capabilities because of their own vulnerabilities.
The fourth difﬁ   culty concerns the implications for the defense industry 
since specialization requires states to abandon the development of certain 
capabilities in favor of others. Fifth, there is the increased complexity of 
military education and instruction. The sixth challenge is that the specialization 
process must start from the premise that NATO is the only organization with 
responsibilities in the Euro-Atlantic security area. In this respect it is worth 
reminding that NATO member states are also part of other organizations and 
subject to the need to deal with speciﬁ  c risks. For instance, Turkey has to 
tackle the PKK problem. Basically, states must maintain the capability to act 
under other security commitments and not duplicate other existing NATO 
military capabilities.
4. NATO AND EU INTEROPERABILITY
IN THE CONTEXT 
OF  THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS
“Pooling and sharing” and “Smart Defense” are two concepts roughly 
referring to the same approach – capabilities’ merger and joint use in order 
to ensure more effective investments in security and defense. Cooperation 
among member states is the central idea around which the two concepts 
are built. However, in terms of the European area, cooperation should be 
approached at supra-national level since 21 states are members of both NATO 
and the EU. Consequently, attention must be paid to the side effects that may 
occur as a result of implementing both “pooling and sharing” and “smart 
defense”. It is obvious that what was initially aimed at preventing resources 
waste may actually lead to a duplication of functions at the level of the two 
organizations. The efforts to prevent this state of affairs are already visible. 
What is common for both approaches is that the idea of     pooling resources 
to develop and / or acquire defense capabilities to be later shared by the 
contributors is not new. “Smart defense” and its European counterpart – 
“pooling and sharing” - are initiatives aimed at reducing the gap between the 
U.S.A. and the European countries in terms of technological and operational 
capabilities, since it is common knowledge that the U.S.A.’s contribution is 
higher as a result of its greater funds’ channeling into the defense budget. 
Besides its role of main contributor to the NATO budget, the U.S.A. is still the 
greatest military power in the world despite its decline in defense investments. 
The differences between the U.S.A. and the European countries in terms of 
their investments in defense are huge. Thus, for 2011, statistics [25] show that the U.S.A. invested no less than 711 billion dollars, while in Europe the largest 
investments were made by the UK totaling 62.7 billion dollars, which is about 
11% of the total U.S.A. effort. Moreover, one can notice the same imbalance 
in terms of the investments made in research and development in the security 
and defense ﬁ  elds between the two sides of the Atlantic.  Moreover, defense 
in Europe actually means the involvement of European states and not of a 
single entity, the EU respectively. This situation can be better explained as 
the expression of the inter-governmental character of the security and defense 
policy that provides for member states to act under the sovereignty principle. 
Therefore, in terms of defense, the European countries’ investments are not 
only much lower than those of their transatlantic partner, but also little focused 
and coordinated - at least before the coining and initiation of the “pooling 
and sharing” and “smart defense” initiatives. Thus, the idea to pool resources 
and share capabilities solves the already mentioned gaps between Europe and 
the U.S.A. that only became larger as a result of the global ﬁ  nancial and 
economic crisis, as well as because of a switch in the interests of the U.S.A. 
for the Asia-Paciﬁ  c region.
The cooperation and coordination efforts between the two organizations 
are therefore vital for the two concepts to be successful in the long term. 
Moreover, before the advent of the economic and ﬁ  nancial crisis, NATO and 
the EU had already developed interoperability frameworks aimed at avoiding 
overlapping functions and taking a complementary approach to security [26]. 
The ﬁ  rst cooperation framework between NATO and the EU was established by 
the “Berlin Plus” agreements that granted the EU access to NATO’s operational 
planning instruments regularly used crisis management operations to conduct its 
own operations. Currently, the NATO-EU agreements on security concern the 
cooperation in crisis management, the ﬁ  ght against terrorism and proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction, exchange of classiﬁ  ed information, and EU’s 
to NATO planning capabilities. In addition, the NATO-EU cooperation often 
materialized in complementary actions in theaters of operations, such as those 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, 
Afghanistan or in the naval operations conducted along the coast of Somalia. 
Therefore, for the two organizations, the need to cooperate in order to avoid 
tasks and functions duplication is a reality acknowledged and accepted for a 
long time. Consequently, the implications of implementing the concepts of 
“smart defense” and “pooling and sharing” are no exception to this rule. 
So far, the accomplishment of the interoperability goal in defense planning 
under the new conditions created by the economic and ﬁ  nancial crisis was 
facilitated by regular meetings of the heads of the two bodies responsible for 
coordinating the efforts related to the implementation of the two concepts: 
EDA and ACT. Such a meeting was held in December 2011, when the heads 
of the two structures discussed how EDA and ACT can work together so that their efforts are complementary and avoid wasting resources [27]. In fact, a 
look at the lists of the already developed programs of the two organizations 
underlines the differences between them in terms of the types of investments 
made. Thus, EDA focuses mainly on logistics and communications, and 
ACT on capabilities for military operations in theaters, troops’ protection 
and related risks and threats such as those arising in cyberspace or weapons 
of mass destruction. As a result, the efﬁ  cient use of these in practice is an 
efﬁ  cient one. At the meeting from December 2011 the topic of a practical 
approach to the NATO-EU interoperability was on the agenda. An example 
in terms of the results yielded by this was the progress made in Afghanistan 
as a result of the projects developed under EDA (i.e. healthcare, DEI ﬁ  ghting 
tools, training helicopter pilots) and used in NATO-led missions.
Therefore, there are reasons to believe in the ability of both organizations 
to cooperate given the current economic conditions when member states 
are facing cuts in defense budgets and need a new way of thinking of 
security and defense issues. In this respect, maintaining a continuous 
contact between relevant institutions in NATO and the EU, dialogue, 
transparency and the exchange of ideas are essential parts to achieving goals 
through the idea of     intelligent defense. Moreover, this kind of NATO-EU 
relationship is all the more necessary as both face the same obstacles in 
their efforts to put “pooling and sharing” and “smart defense” into practice. 
5. CONCLUSIONS
“Pooling and sharing” and “smart defense” were presented as ideal 
solutions to maintain the defense capability of the states given the Euro-
Atlantic economic and ﬁ  nancial crisis. The ideas, though not new, have had a 
far greater impact and success than in the past due to the international context 
which enabled their presentation in a positive light and in an unduly way. 
Of course, the idea of     putting together and sharing resources for defense 
so as to allow the use of defense capabilities at lower costs is useful and 
justiﬁ  able. Its success is best explained as the result of the budget cuts in all 
ﬁ  elds, the military one included, faced by the NATO and the EU member 
states. However, there is also a downside to this expressed at the level of 
the difﬁ  culties and obstacles encountered along the way and with impact on 
defense planning. The specialization component of “smart defense” is one of 
the most signiﬁ  cant challenges in this respect, inﬂ  uencing and increasing the 
complexity of the defense planning area in the case of each nation. Abandoning 
the development of capabilities to focus investments on others, based on 
the idea that they will be provided by the other member states requires a 
redeﬁ  nition of the defense industry, the organization of the armed structures, 
education and instruction of military or civilian personnel, as well as of the tasks undertaken at national level. All this could lead, at least on short term, 
to economic imbalances in the military. Moreover, another problem to be 
overcome is that of mutual conﬁ  dence between states. No country will be 
willing to neglect the development of the capabilities necessary for national 
security and integrity as long as the sense of security in terms of other countries’ 
level of commitment lacks. In addition, in this respect, the way the relations 
between European states are managed gains an increased importance for the 
successful implementation of intelligent defense. Ss shown by most analyses 
of European security, this can explained as these countries’ attachment to the 
idea of     nation, identity, sovereignty and defense, which is one of the most 
sensitive areas [28]. Therefore, in our opinion, the key to the success of both 
initiatives is the relationship built among the European states. Strengthening 
cooperation, mutual trust, overcoming, when appropriate, the Westphalian 
vision on security and defense are sine qua non conditions both for the smart 
defense and for the efforts to pool and share the military capabilities.
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